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re: The Hawaii Missile Alert Was the Software Developer's Fault VIEW POST

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re: One can only hope we learn from this, but I could see a possibility where this could make requirements even more rigid in the ways you've described...
 

One of the things FedGov has always struggled with is how to enact "checks and balances" that don't ultimately become /rigid requirements/. There are a lot of complicating issues in government acquisition, and political maneuvering can completely crater otherwise great ideas (this is true at companies, too, but I would argue is less prevalent).

It's worth noting that the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 actually has a section devoted to piloting an Agile development & acquisition process for defense software systems to address a slew of issues, including the one we are discussing, here.

All of Subtitle H in the NDAA-2018 is relevant for people with an interest in how the FedGov handles software, but Section 873 specifically lays out the Agile Development initiative:

congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/h...

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